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The ongoing worldwide financial and economic crisis has rejuvenated the interest in systemic risk in the financial
system, its dramatic spill over to the real economy and whether and how it should be addressed by public policies. We
contribute to this debate with an analysis of the risk taking behaviour of financial intermediaries that are protected by
limited liability and may deliberately choose a level of risk in excess of the social optimum. We show how the level of
economywide risk taking depends on the distribution of equity among intermediaries and the level of interest rate in the
economy.
Our key assumption is that outside providers of funds cannot tell apart “prudent” and well diversified banks from
“imprudent” ones overly exposed to one particular asset, because the balance sheets of individual intermediaries are
imperfectly observable, or opaque. This assumption is consistent with the view of several commentators of the crisis
including Brunnermeier (2009), Acharya and Richardson (2009), and Dubecq et al. (2009). In the decade prior to the crisis,
risk transfer instruments, which have reached a very large scale in the U.S., have increased the opacity of banks' leverage and
risk-taking incentives (Acharya and Schnabl, 2009). First, regulatory loopholes allowed banks to evade capital requirements
by securitising assets and providing (unregulated) liquidity support to “shadow” (i.e., off-balance-sheet) entities (Acharyarev.2013.07.003
ax: +33 1 69 33 34 27.
ouard.challe@polytechnique.edu (E. Challe), benoit.mojon@banque-france.fr (B. Mojon),
and Richardson, 2009). Second, the financial sector as a whole effectively repurchased much of the senior tranches of
structured products, whose payoff distributions was particularly difficult to assess (see, e.g., Coval et al., 2009). Third, some
banks actively relied on “window dressing” to manipulate leverage figures – by selling asset before the books releases to
repurchase them at a later date (see, e.g., The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). Last but not least, this opacity may
have taken the form of shadow subsidiaries that were used to absorb poorly performing assets, as was revealed by the
investigation on Lehman's bankruptcy. While the opacity of the financial sector may have reached unprecedented levels
during the run-up to the crisis and the crisis itself, it has long been recognised as a key issue in that industry and one of the
fundamental reasons for why it should be regulated. For example, Morgan (2002) shows that bond raters disagree
significantly more about U.S. financial intermediaries than they do over other firms, and interprets this result as evidence
that banks are intrinsically more opaque – essentially because their assets are difficult to observe and change at a fast pace.1
This feature of the industry severely limits the ability of outsiders (investors and rating agencies alike) to assess changes in
bank's capital structure in real time.
When intermediaries' balance sheets are opaque, those intermediaries with relatively low levels of capital may be
tempted to hold high-risk portfolios, or even to gamble for resurrection in the face of worsening economic conditions.
In our model, intermediaries' limited liability creates incentives to increase leverage and hold insufficiently diversified
portfolios, which raise intermediaries' return on equity in case of success while transferring much of their losses to their
creditors in case of failure. This tendency, however, is alleviated by the inside equity stake of intermediaries' shareholders, which
disciplines risk-taking and thereby limits leverage and favours portfolio diversification. We show that this trade-off gives rise to
an endogenous sorting of intermediaries along the equity dimension, with well capitalised intermediaries holding diversified
portfolios and keeping a limited level of leverage (that is, behaving prudently), while poorly capitalised ones heavily resort to
leverage and invest in correlated assets (i.e., behaving imprudently). Opacity implies that the former are not readily
distinguishable from the latter, so that risk-prone behaviour may prosper without being immediately sanctioned by higher
borrowing rates.
One property of our model is that the proportion of imprudent intermediaries and, therefore, the level of systemic risk in the
financial system, crucially depend on both the cross-sectional distribution of capital and the prevailing interest rate. The
endogenous determination of the number of imprudent intermediaries jointly with the interest rate is our key contribution.
Equipped with this joint equilibrium outcome, we analyse the impact on the interest rate and the number of imprudent
intermediaries of two exogenous aggregate shocks: a lending boom that shifts the loan supply curve rightwards; and an equity
squeeze that shifts the distribution of banks' capital leftwards. As we show, the downward pressure on the equilibrium interest
rate that follows the lending boom raises the number of imprudent intermediaries and hence the level of economywide risk
shifting (the risk-taking channel of low interest rates). This mechanism is consistent with the recent microeconometric evidence
on the risk-taking channel, which suggests that low interest rates tend favour bank risk-taking. For example Jimenez et al. (2011)
present direct evidence that falling short-term interest rates systematically favour risk-taking by Spanish banks, especially those
at the lower end of the capital distribution. Relatedly, Ioannidou et al. (2009) identify the exogenous impact of interest rate on
bank risk taking by looking at dollarised Bolivia (1999–2003), and find that low interest rates were associated with the granting
of loans with a higher probability of default, granted to low-rated borrowers, and commanding lower spreads. Altunbas et al.
(2010) and Adrian and Shin (2009) focus on banks operating in the U.S. and Europe and point out to the same relationship
between interest rates and bank risk taking. As far as we are aware, our paper is the first to offer a theoretical model wherein
falling interest rates cause banks to choose riskier portfolios.
Finally, our model predicts that an equity squeeze (that is, a reduction in the overall equity level of the banking sector
after a bad aggregate shock) also raises risk taking when the supply of funds is sufficiently elastic, due to a form of “gambling
for resurection” behaviour. Arguably, both shocks occurred in the run-up to the current crisis. In the first half of the 2000s,
capital inflows from China and oil-exporting countries into the U.S. and the accommodative monetary policy of the Fed both
contributed to keep the yield curve low. Second, the tightening of U.S. monetary policy in 2004 and the rise in delinquency
rates on subprime mortgages from 2006 onwards may have deteriorated the equity position of exposed intermediaries and
thereby favoured gambling strategies.2
In our model, systemic risk in the financial sector arises from the interaction between (i) intermediaries' limited liability
and option to default (the risk shifting problem); (ii) their incentive to correlate their risk exposure (the endogenous
correlation problem); and (iii) the difficulty for outside lenders to discriminate individual institutions on the basis of their
true net worth level (the opacity problem). While our model is the first to explicitly connect these three dimensions, we
build on many contributions that have studied each of them separately. Our modelling of the risk shifting problem closely
follows Allen and Gale (2000) and Acharya (2009), who show that limited liability leads financial institutions to overweight1 See also Iannotta (2006) for similar evidence about European banks, and Flannery et al. (2010) on the increase in the opacity of U.S. banks during the
crisis. A simple empirical investigation, presented in the separate technical appendix to the paper, confirms on a sample of 77 French banks that banks'
capital to asset ratios are difficult to forecast accurately at the one-quarter horizon. First, the average standard deviation of these ratios between 1993Q2
and 2009Q1 is 4.42%. Second, standard autoregressive forecasting models are characterised by fairly large standard errors, 1.43% on average. The standard
error of these forecasting models is greater than 1% for 36% of the banks, and greater than 3% for 17% of the banks. Such a large uncertainty about the one-
quarter ahead values of individual bank capital to asset ratios is remarkable.
2 Landier et al. (2010) provide direct evidence of this behaviour for New Century Financial Corporation, a major subprime originator prior to its
bankruptcy in 2007.
risky assets in their portfolio, relative to the first best.3 There are two main differences between earlier models of risk
shifting and ours. In Allen and Gale (2000), market segmentation and limited-liability debt contracts twist intermediaries'
risk-taking incentives and lead to an overvaluation (or “bubble”) in the price of the risky asset. In both Allen and Gale (2000)
and Acharya (2009), intermediaries' excessive risk-taking is ubiquitous in that all banks expose themselves to the risk of
bankrupcy. We see this property as somewhat extreme, which leads us to emphasise the disciplining role of shareholders'
equity stake and to endogenise each intermediary's (discrete) choice of adopting or not a bankruptcy-prone behaviour.4
This asset correlation problem has been the focus of several recent contributions, both empirical and theoretical. Acharya and
Richardson (2009) notably document the overexposure of the U.S. banking sector to securitised mortgages prior to the current
crisis, with the risk associated with those securities being effectively kept within the sector (via the use of unregulated liquidity
enhancements or the repurchase of CDO tranches) rather than transferred to other investors and disseminated throughout the
economy. Greenlaw et al. (2008) had reached similar conclusions. The dominant explanation for this excessive correlation,
apparently at odds with standard finance theory, is that it is natural consequence of the time-inconsistency of ex post bail-out or
interest rate policies; namely, it is optimal to save banks ex post when a large number of them fails, which precisely occurs when
they have chosen correlated portfolios in the first place – see Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) and Farhi and Tirole (2012). Our
model differs from those in the source of moral hazard that leads to excess portfolio correlation, i.e., limited liability rather than
time-inconsistent policies. In Acharya (2009), the economywide correlation of risks arises from systemic failure externalities
amongst intermediaries. The main difference between Acharya's endogenous correlation mechanism and ours is that in his
framework banks are assumed to hold undiversified portfolio (because they are industry-specific lenders), and the puzzle to be
explained is why correlation occurs across banks (i.e., why they tend to lend to the same industries). By contrast, in our model
banks are unspecialised and choose the correlation of their portfolio at the individual level; but since those who opt for highly
correlated portfolios favour the stochastically dominated asset, the very same asset is overinvested in at the aggregate level,
hence more risk-taking at the individual level directly translates into greater systemic risk.
Finally, several authors have discussed how opacity may jeopardise financial stability. The difficulty for unsophisticated
outside lenders to perfectly observe banks' assets is a traditional argument for why banks must be supervised (e.g.,
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). More recently, Biais et al. (2010) have argued that financial innovations create asymmetric
information problems that worsen the opacity of the financial sector. Our model focuses on a specific implication of opacity:
the fact that outside providers of funds may find it difficult to accurately measure bank shareholders' stake, and thereby
their risk-taking incentives.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium level of
interest rate and systemic risk in the opaque economy. Section 4 studies the effect on the equilibrium of a lending boom and
an equity squeeze. Section 5 extends the baseline model in several dimensions.
2. The model
2.1. Timing, states and assets
There are two dates, t¼ f1; 2g, two possible states at date 2, s¼ fs1; s2g, and two (supply elastic) real assets available for
purchase at date 1, a¼ fa1; a2g. At date 1, loan contracts are signed and investment in the real assets take place; at date 2,
the state is revealed, asset payoffs are collected and financial contracts are resolved – possibly via one party's default. Any
unit of investment in a1 pays R1 ¼ Rh140 if s¼ s1 and 0 otherwise, while any unit of investment in a2 pays R2 ¼ Rh240 if
s¼ s2 and Rl240 otherwise.5 State s1 (s2) occurs with probability pðs1Þ≡p¼ 0:5ξ, ξ∈½0; 0:5 (pðs2Þ ¼ 1p). Finally the two
assets are assumed to have identical expected payoffs, i.e.,
pRh1 ¼ pRl2 þ ð1pÞRh2: ð1Þ
This payoff distribution has the following properties: when considered in isolation, a1 is more risky (in the sense of a
mean-preserving spread) than a2; however, the strict negative correlation between the two assets implies that one of them
may be used as a hedge against the portfolio risk generated by the other. In particular, a suitably diversified portfolio pays
the certain gross return pRh1 – thereby entirely eliminating bankruptcy risk for a leveraged investor. This simple payoff
structure allows us to focus on the joint choice of leverage and portfolio correlation as the ultimate source of endogenous
aggregate risk in the economy.63 See also Rochet (1992) for an early analysis of bank risk taking under limited liability. As pointed out in, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and
Palomino and Prat (2003), the convex reward structures often enjoyed by money managers are another potential mechanism conducive to excess risk-
taking in the financial sector.
4 Another difference with these contributions is that in our model excessive risk taking takes the form of insufficient portfolio diversification in
equilibrium, rather than overexposure to a risky asset relative to a safe one.
5 Assuming that asset a1 has no liquidation value in state s2 greatly simplifies the analysis in Section 4, where we need to sum up debt repayments by
heterogenous intermediaries. Alternatively, one may assume that the asset has some liquidation value that is lost in case of default (due, e.g., to bankrupcy
costs). Finally, it is straightforward to check that the correlation coefficient between the two returns is 1.
6 Since the two real assets are perfectly negatively correlated, they can be combined to create a safe asset with expected payoff pRl1. Our main results
would thus be identical if we assumed the existence of a risk-free asset and a mean-preserving risky asset (with payoff Rh1 or 0). Both specifications are
tractable, but that chosen here stresses the importance of insufficient portfolio diversification.
2.2. Agents and market structure
There are two types of agents in the economy: “lenders” and “intermediaries”, both risk-neutral and in mass one. Our
market structure (and implied decisions) is similar to that in Allen and Gale (2000) and Acharya (2009). In particular,
markets are segmented, in the sense that intermediaries have exclusive access to the menu of assets a (due, for example, to
asymmetric information, difference in asset management abilities, regulation etc.). Intermediaries may borrow from the
lenders to achieve their desired level of asset investment, and are protected by limited-liability debt contracts. Once lending
has taken place, the portfolio chosen by the intermediaries is out of the control of the lenders. We modify this basic
framework in two directions. First, we assume that an intermediary's funding partly comes out of inside equity, which will
serve both to buffer the intermediary's balance-sheet against adverse shocks and to discipline its shareholders' risk-taking
attitude.7 Second, we study the equilibrium of an economy populated by a large number of intermediaries with
heterogenous equity levels that are imperfectly observed by outside providers of funds.
Intermediaries. Intermediaries' shareholders maximise value, given their (exogenously given) initial equity stake e40.
Denoting by ðxiÞi ¼ 1;2≥0 the portfolio of an intermediary, its balance sheet constraint may be written as
∑xi≤eþ b; ð2Þ
with i¼1, 2 and where b is the intermediary's debt. Following Allen and Gale (2000) and Acharya (2009), we assume that
intermediaries face a convex, nonpecuniary investment cost cð∑xiÞ, which satisfies c′ðÞ40, c″ðÞ40 and cð0Þ ¼ 0. In
particular, we follow Acharya's (2009, p. 230) interpretation of this cost function as a simple and tractable representation of
the costs associated with loan initiation, monitoring and administration, not explicitly modelled but plausibly convex in the
number of loans.8 For the sake of tractability, our analysis in the body of the paper is carried out under the assumption that
cðÞ is quadratic, but we show in the technical appendix that all our results carry over to the more general isoelastic case.
More specifically, cðÞ takes the form
cð∑xiÞ ¼ ð2θÞ1ð∑xiÞ2; θ40: ð3Þ
Given its initial equity stake e and a contracted gross interest rate r on borrowed funds, an intermediary chooses ðxiÞ and,
by implication, b – i.e., it chooses both the size and the structure of the balance sheet. Limited liability implies that an
intermediary's payoff net of debt repayment is bounded below by zero, so the ex post net payoff generated by the portfolio
ðxiÞ is max½∑xiRirb;0. Substituting (2) (with equality) into the latter expression, we find the date 1 value of an
intermediary with initial equity e to be
VðeÞ ¼max
xi≥0
∑
s ¼ 1;2
pðsÞðmax½reþ∑xiðRirÞ;0Þcð∑xiÞ: ð4Þ
In solving (4), intermediaries differ in the amount of the inside equity stake of their shareholders, e. The cross-sectional
distribution of equity levels is assumed to be characterised by a continuous density function f ðe; ϵÞ with support ½0; emax
and c.d.f. Fðe; ϵÞ ¼ R e0 f ði; ϵÞ di. Since the number of intermediaries is normalised to one we have Fðemax; ϵÞ ¼ 1, while
E≡
R emax
0 ef ðe; ϵÞ de is the total capital of the intermediary sector. The parameter ϵ indexes the location of the density function,
with an increase in ϵ being associated with a rightward shifts in the distribution of equity level (so that Fϵðe; ϵÞo0.) Whilst
the density f ðe; ϵÞ and hence the aggregate equity level E are taken as exogenous in the baseline version of the model, we
provide an extension in Section 5.3 wherein E responds endogenously to macroeconomic conditions.
Lenders. Funds are supplied by the households, or “lenders”, who lend their funds to intermediaries at date 1 and collect
repayments at date 2. Each lender enjoys labour income w40 at date 1 and maximises uðc1Þ þ c2s, where c1 is date 1
consumption, c2s consumption at date 2 in state s, and uðÞ a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave function. Let ρs denote lenders' ex post date 2 return in state s from lending to the intermediary sector, and
ρ≡∑spðsÞρs the corresponding ex ante return. (Note that both in general differ from the face lending rate r due to the
possibility of intermediaries' default.) Lenders choose their loan supply Bs, where Bs ¼ arg max uðc1Þ þ∑spðsÞc2s, subject to
c1 ¼wB and c2s ¼ Bρs. The implied loan supply curve is
Bsðρ;wÞ ¼wu′1ðρÞ; ð5Þ
which is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments. In short, risk neutrality implies that lenders value the
expected return on loans, ρ, with the implied loan return curve being shifted by date 1 income, w. We impose specific
parameter restrictions later on ensuring that Bsðρ;wÞ40 in equilibrium.7 This paper focuses on agency problems between the intermediary's owner-manager and its creditors, and hence abstracts from incorporating
inobservability and conflict of interest between the owners and the managers. See Acharya et al. (2010) for a model of risk-shifting that explicitely
incorporates both dimensions.
8 Alternatively, one may think of a rising unit cost of search for new projects as a foundation for a convex costs function. Surveying earlier evidence on
the degree of returns to scale in the financial industry and carrying out their own tests, Stimpert and Laux (2011) conclude that “increasing size is
associated with higher costs that increase at an increasing rate, inevitably resulting in diseconomies of scale”.
2.3. First best
The key contractual friction in this economy is that an intermediary maximises the expected terminal payoff to its
shareholders, who are protected by limited liability and hence transfer losses to the debtors in case of default. Before
analysing the implications of this distortion, we compute the first-best outcome where this distortion is removed.
Planner's problem. Let ~Cs denote the date 2 consumption of intermediaries' shareholders in state s¼1, 2, C1 the
consumption of lenders at date 1 and C2s the consumption of lenders at date 2 and in state s¼1, 2. Denoting the planner's
portfolio by ðx^iÞ, the planner chooses ðx^1; x^2Þ so as to maximise uðC1Þ þ∑s ¼ 1;2pðsÞðC2s þ ~CsÞcð∑x^iÞ subject to
∑x^i þ C1≤wþ E; ð6Þ
C21 þ ~C1≤x^1Rh1 þ x^2Rl2; ð7Þ
C22 þ ~C2≤x^2Rh2; ð8Þ
where (6) is the date 1 resource constraint and (7) and (8) are the state-contingent date 2 resource constraints. Let λ1, λ21
and λ22 denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with (6)–(8). The first-order conditions with respect to C1, C21, C22, x^1 and
x^2 are, respectively,
u′ðC1Þλ1 ¼ 0; pλ21 ¼ 0; 1pλ22 ¼ 0;
c′ð∑x^iÞλ1 þ λ21Rh1 ¼ 0; c′ð∑x^iÞλ1 þ λ21Rl2 þ λ22Rh2 ¼ 0:
Eliminating the Lagrange multipliers, using (1) and (3) and rearranging, we find that the first-best level of aggregate
investment ∑x^i is determined by the following expression:
∑x^i ¼ θ½pRh1u′ðwþ E∑x^iÞ: ð9Þ
Note that Eq. (9) uniquely characterises aggregate investment but not the optimal portfolio (x^1; x^2), since all portfolios
belonging to the x^1 þ x^2 ¼∑x^i line, with ∑x^i given by (9), are optimal in a first-best sense. This is because (i) the risk
differential across the two assets is mean-preserving, and (ii) agents are risk neutral (i.e., second-period utility is linear).
Hence, any reallocation of (x^1; x^2) that holds ∑x^i at its optimal value yields the same aggregate welfare.
Decentralisation. Since the limited-liability constraint is the only friction affecting intermediaries' portfolio choice, the
planner's problem can be decentralised by removing this constraint—or equivalently, by punishing default sufficiently
severely. When the option to default is not operative, the value of an intermediary in (4) becomes
V^ ðeÞ ¼max
x^ i≥0
reþ ð∑x^iÞðpRh1rÞcð∑x^iÞ; ð10Þ
where we have used the fact that ∑spðsÞ∑xiðRirÞ ¼ ð∑xiÞðpRh1rÞ under the payoff distribution (1). From (10), the efficient
portfolio satisfies ∑x^i ¼ θðpRh1rÞ. As in the planners' problem, this condition determines the optimal investment level ∑x^i
but not the optimal portfolio ðx^1; x^2Þ – since, given r, a continuum of such portfolios are consistent with ∑x^i ¼ θðpRh1rÞ. To
further characterise the set of feasible portfolios consistent with the first-best level of investment, we note that
intermediaries must be solvent in both states for the limited liability constraint not to bind. The solvency conditions
impose that a given portfolio ðx^iÞi ¼ 1;2 never generates a negative net payoff ex post, i.e.,
reþ∑x^iðRirÞ≥0; for s¼ s1; s2; ð11ÞFig. 1. Intermediaries' optimal portfolios (a) and value (b).
Fig. 2. Share of imprudent intermediaries (a) and loanable funds equilibrium (b).where ðR1; R2Þ ¼ ðRh1; Rl2Þ if s¼ s1 and ð0; Rh2Þ if s¼ s2. Combining (11) with the optimal balance-sheet size ∑x^i ¼ θðpRh1rÞ,
we find that a solvent portfolio must satisfy x^1∈½xn1; xn1, 0oxn1oxn1o1, with
xn1 ¼
θðpRh1rÞðrRl2Þre
Rh1Rl2
; xn1 ¼
θðpRh1rÞðRh2rÞ þ re
Rh2
;
where 0oxn1ox
n
1oθðpRh1rÞ whenever the intermediary is leveraged. In short, given the optimal balance-sheet size
θðpRhrÞ, x^1 cannot be too low, otherwise the intermediary would default in state s1; it cannot be too high either (and hence
x^2 too low), otherwise default would occur in state s2. All portfolios satisfying x^1 þ x^2 ¼ θðpRh1rÞ and xn1o x^1oxn1 are
consistent with (11) and provide the same utility to the intermediary (due to risk neutrality). These portfolios, which we
refer to as “prudent”, lie along a closed subinterval of the x^2 ¼ θðpRh1rÞx^1– see Fig. 1(a) below. Finally, note that the
negative correlation between the two underlying assets implies that among the prudent portfolios a riskless one may be
constructed by appropriately weighting the two assets in the portfolio. The riskless portfolio has the property of paying
identical payoffs across aggregate states, i.e.,
x^1R
h
1 þ x^2Rl2 ¼ x^2Rh2; ð12Þ
where the left and right hand sides are the portfolio payoffs in states s¼1 and s¼2, respectively. Eqs. (1) and (12), together
with the fact that ∑x^i ¼ θðpRh1rÞ, uniquely pin down the safe portfolio, which is given by
x^1; x^2
 ¼ θ pRh1r pRh2Rl2
Rh2
; θ pRh1r
 
p
Rh1
Rh2
 !
: ð13Þ
Equilibrium. To complete the characterisation of the first-best outcome, we must compute the equilibrium interest rate r^
that results from the equality of the aggregate demand and supply for loanable funds. Since ∑x^i ¼ θðpRh1rÞ, it follows
that the leverage of an intermediary with inside equity e and facing the interest rate r is given by b^ðr; eÞ ¼ θðpRh1rÞe.
The aggregate demand for funds is obtained by summing up the demands for debt by all intermediaries, i.e.,
B^
dðr; ϵÞ ¼
Z emax
0
b^ðr; eÞ dFðe; ϵÞ ¼ θðpRh1rÞE: ð14Þ
On the other hand, since intermediaries never default in the first-best equilibrium, lenders are repaid r with certainty.
Hence, ρ¼ r and we may rewrite (5) as
B^
sðr;wÞ ¼wu′1ðrÞ: ð15Þ
B^
dðr; ϵÞ is continuous and linearly decreasing in r, while B^sðr;wÞ is continuous and strictly increasing in r (since u″ðÞo0).
Hence the two curves cross at most once and, if they do, give a unique equilibrium interest rate r^ . In the remainder of the
paper, we focus on equilibria in which all intermediaries are active and leveraged. Lemma 1 provides a sufficient condition
for the existence of a first-best equilibrium with this property.
Lemma 1. Assume that (i) θpRh14emax and (ii) w4emaxE þ u′1ðpRh1emax=θÞ. Then, the first-best equilibrium is unique and
such that b^ðr; eÞ40 for all e∈½0; emax .
Essentially, a unique equilibrium with all intermediaries being leveraged exists if both expected asset payoffs (i.e., pRh1)
and lenders' income (i.e., w) are sufficiently large. This equilibrium is depicted in Fig. 2(b).
3. Loanable funds equilibrium under risk-shifting
3.1. Intermediaries' behaviour
The presence of limited-liability debt contracts affects investment choices by altering intermediares' payoffs relative to
the first best. Namely, value maximisation under limited liability may lead an intermediary to choose a high risk/high
expected payoff strategy, thereby maximising its own payoff in case of success while transferring losses to the lenders in
case default.
We work the problem of an intermediary (i.e., Eq. (4)) backwards. Let us refer to as “prudent” an intermediary whose
asset portfolio satisfies both solvency constraints in (11), and denote its value by VnðeÞ. Similarly, let us call “imprudent” an
intermediary whose portfolio violates one of the two inequalities in (11) – thereby triggering default in one of the two states –,
and denote its value by VnnðeÞ. The intermediary chooses the best option, giving a value to the initial equity holders of
VðeÞ ¼max½VnðeÞ; VnnðeÞ.
Prudent intermediaries. Trivially, the absence of the option to default implies that the portfolio choice of a prudent
intermediary is the same as in the first best:
∑xni ¼ θðpRh1rÞ; xn1oxn1oxn1; ð16Þ
bnðr; eÞ ¼ θðpRh1rÞe: ð17Þ
Substituting (16) and (17) into (10), we find the value of a prudent intermediary to be
VnðeÞ ¼ reþ ðθ=2ÞðpRh1rÞ2 ð ¼ V^ ðeÞÞ: ð18Þ
Imprudent intermediaries. Imprudent intermediaries, unlike prudent ones, correlate their portfolio and consequently
default in one of the two states. Consider first the optimal portfolio choice of an intermediary having chosen to overweight
asset a1 in its portfolio, and thus defaults at date 2 if state s2 occurs. Ex ante, this intermediary earns zero with probability
1p, so the objective (4) becomes
VnnðeÞ ¼max
xi≥0
pðreþ x1ðRh1rÞ þ x2ðRl2rÞÞcð∑xiÞ: ð19Þ
Since x1 and x2 enter symmetrically in the cost function while R
h
14R
l
2, the intermediary must entirely disregard a2,
leading to the optimal portfolio:
ðxnn1 ; xnn2 Þ ¼ ðθpðRh1rÞ;0Þ; ð20Þ
bnnðr; eÞ ¼ θpðRh1rÞe: ð21Þ
An alternative investment strategy for an imprudent intermediary would be to overweight a2, and hence to default if s1
occurs ex post. However, it is straightforward to show that it is never optimal to do so under our distributional assumptions.
Indeed, imprudent behaviour implies that the intermediary earns 0 if the wrong state occurs, and accordingly only values
the state corresponding to the asset being invested in. Since the univariate distribution of a1 is a mean-preserving spread of
that of a2, a1 has more value to the imprudent intermediary than a2.9,10 Substituting (20) into (19), we find the optimised
value of an imprudent intermediary to be
VnnðeÞ ¼ preþ ðθ=2ÞðpðRh1rÞÞ2: ð22Þ
To summarise, imprudent intermediaries have two distinguishing characteristics, relative to prudent intermediaries.
First, they perfectly correlate their asset portfolio (since xnn2 ¼ 0), thereby maximising both their payoff in case of success and
lenders' losses in case of default. Second, they endogenously choose a larger balance sheet size (since xnn1 4∑x
n
i ), which in
turns implies more leverage for any given level of equity e (i.e., bnnðr; eÞ4bnðr; eÞ). This latter property is a direct implication
of the fact that imprudent intermediaries avoid repayment with probability 1p. This effectively lowers the cost of debt
ex ante for any given face interest rate r, relative to the cost faced by prudent intermediaries (who repay in both states). In
the (x1; x2) plane, the imprudent portfolio lies on the x1 axis and the left of the x2 ¼ θðpRh1rÞx1 line – see Fig. 1(a).
Value of an intermediary. Expressions (18) and (22) reflect the joint roles of equity and the borrowing rate in affecting the
intermediary's value and thus the incentives to behave prudently or imprudently. For a given level of equity and borrowing
rate, imprudent intermediaries buy larger portfolios, consequently earn large payoffs in case of success, which goes towards
raising value (see the second term in the right hand side of both expressions); however, they also risk losing their equity
(with probability 1p), which tends to reduce value for any given initial equity stake (the first term). Comparing (18) and
(22) and assuming that indifferent intermediaries behave prudently, we find that an intermediary engages in imprudent
behaviour whenever its equity state is sufficiently low, that is, if and only if
eo ~e rð Þ≡θ pRh1
1þ p
2
 
r
 
ð23Þ
Eq. (23) implies that a poorly capitalised intermediary, i.e., one with low equity stake and hence relatively little to lose in
case of default, will engage in imprudent behaviour, while an intermediary with high shareholders' equity stake, and hence
much to lose in case of default, will behave prudently. The implied value of an intermediary as a function of e, i.e.,
VðeÞ ¼max½VnðeÞ;VnnðeÞ is depicted in Fig. 1(b).
A key implication of (23) is that a lower borrowing rate raises the cut-off equity level below which the intermediary
chooses to behave imprudently. To further understand why this is the case, compare the impact of a marginal rise in r on
VnðeÞ and VnnðeÞ – that is, for each strategy, the loss in the intermediary's value associated with a rise in the face financing
cost. Using (18) and (22), we find these falls to be Vnr ðeÞ ¼bnðr; eÞ and Vnnr ðeÞ ¼ pbnnðr; eÞ. These expressions follow from the
envelop theorem and have a straightforward interpretation. For the prudent intermediary, who never defaults and hence
always repays r per unit of debt, the loss in value associated with a marginal rise in r is its total amount debt, bnðr; eÞ. For the
imprudent intermediary, who only repays in state 1, the loss in value is the relevant amount of debt, bnnðr; eÞ, times the
probability that it will actually be repaid, p. For a rise in r to lower the threshold ~e, it must be the case that VnðeÞ increases
more than VnnðeÞ for the marginal intermediary, i.e., that for whom Vnð ~eÞ ¼ Vnnð ~eÞ (i.e., that intermediary must turn prudent,
rather than imprudent, following a rise in the interest rate). It must thus be the case that Vnr ð~eÞ4Vnnr ð~eÞ or, equivalently by
using the two expressions above, bnðr; ~eÞopbnnðr; ~eÞ: a switch by the marginal intermediary from the prudent to the
imprudent investment strategy must involve a sufficiently large increase in leverage. This property can be shown to hold not
only in the quadratic case but also for any isoelastic investment cost function (see the technical appendix for details).
3.2. Aggregate demand for funds
Our key assumption here is that while the distribution of equity levels is perfectly known to outside lenders, financial
opacity prevents lenders from observing the equity level of any particular intermediary. Hence, lenders cannot condition the
loan rate on the specific equity level of an intermediary, so that a single borrowing rate r applies to the entire market.11
Then, we may define
gðr; ϵÞ≡
Z ~eðrÞ
0
f ðe; ϵÞ de¼ Fð~eðrÞ; ϵÞ ð24Þ
as the proportion of imprudent intermediaries in the economy at a given interest rate r. Note from (24) that
grðr; ϵÞ ¼ θð1þ pÞf ð~eðrÞ; ϵÞ=2o0, that is, a lower face interest rate raises the proportion of imprudent intermediaries in
the economy by increasing the threshold equity level ~eðrÞ. Moreover, we have gϵðr; ϵÞ ¼ Fϵð ~eðrÞ; ϵÞo0, that is, an increase in ϵ
lowers the proportion of imprudent intermediary (for any given value of the cut-off ~eðrÞ). This is illustrated in Fig. 2(a),9 An intermediary choosing to default in state s1 does not value its payoff in that state and hence maximises ð1pÞðx1ð0rÞ þ x2ðRh2rÞ þ reÞcðx1 þ x2Þ,
leading to the optimal portfolio ð ~xnn1 ; ~xnn2 Þ ¼ ð0; θð1pÞðRh2rÞÞ. Computing and comparing the ex ante utility levels associated with ðxnn1 ; xnn2 Þ and ð ~xnn1 ; ~xnn2 Þ
leads the former to be preferred, provided that ξ is not too large.
10 Note that an implication of (20) and (21) is that it is always optimal for the imprudent intermediary to invest its entire own equity in the risky asset.
In particular, since asset payoffs are seized in case of default regardless of how assets were purchased, it is never worthwhile to invest one's own equity
level e into a safe combination of assets while using leverage b to invest in the risky asset.
11 We assume for simplicity that intermediaries are completely identical from the point of view of the lender. Our results carry over in a set-up with
partially segmented market involving different groups of intermediaries, with the members of each group facing the same interest rate (see Section 5.2
below for an example of this). What matters for our results is the presence of an unobserved residual heterogeneity in interminedaries' equity stake.
which depicts an example of a distribution of equity levels f ðe; ϵÞ and threshold ~eðrÞ. The share of imprudent intermediaries
corresponds to the shaded area below the f ðe; ϵÞ-curve and to the left of the ~eðrÞ line. Holding ϵ constant, an increase
(decrease) in r shifts ~eðrÞ to the left (right) and hence shrinks (expands) the shaded area; holding r(and hence ~eðrÞ) constant,
and increase (decrease) in ϵ shifts f ðe; ϵÞ to the right (left) and hence shrinks (expands) the shaded area.
The total demand for funds Bdðr; ϵÞ aggregates the leverage choices of individual intermediaries and is thus given by
Bdðr; ϵÞ ¼
Z ~eðrÞ
0
bnnðr; eÞ dFðe; ϵÞ þ
Z emax
~eðrÞ
bnðr; eÞ dFðe; ϵÞ: ð25Þ
Eq. (25) shows that the interest rate will affect the demand for loanable funds in two ways: first, it will affect the demand
for funding of every single intermediaries (the ‘intensive’ leverage margin); and second, by shifting the threshold ~eðrÞ, it will
cause a discontinuous change in the leverage choice of some of them, from prudent to imprudent or the other way around
(the ‘extensive’ leverage margin.) Substituting (17) and (21) into the latter expression, using (24) and rearranging, the total
demand for funds is found to be
Bdðr; ϵÞ ¼ θ½pRh1rð1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞÞE: ð26Þ
In the ðB; rÞ plane, the Bdðr; ϵÞ curve lies to the right of the B^dðr; ϵÞ curve, its first-best counterpart. This is because, for any
given value of r, the risk-shifting equilibrium includes a nonnegative fraction of imprudent intermediaries, whose demand
for debt is larger than that of prudent intermediaries at any given interest rate r (see Fig. 2b).
There are two properties of the aggregate demand for loanable funds that are worth discussing at this stage. First, it is
continuous and decreasing in the borrowing rate, i.e., Bdr ðr; ϵÞ ¼θð1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞÞ þ θð1pÞrgrðr; ϵÞo0. Two factors
contribute to make the demand for funds a downward-sloping function of r. First, a lower interest rate raises the leverage
of both prudent and imprudent intermediaries – see the optimal investment rules (16) and (20). Second, a lower interest
rate induces “marginal” intermediaries (those which are close to the cut-off equity level ~e in (23)) to switch from prudent to
imprudent behaviour, and those experience a discontinuous increase in their leverage – again, by (16) and (20). Hence,
changes in the borrowing rate affect the intensive (i.e., conditional on not switching behaviour) and extensive (i.e., the
number of intermediaries who switch behaviour) leverage margins in the same direction.
The second relevant property of the curve is that, holding r constant, Bd increases as the distribution of equity shifts
leftwards. That is, Bdϵ ðr; ϵÞ ¼ θrð1pÞgϵðr; ϵÞo0. This is because, as the equity level of intermediaries decreases, some of them
switch from prudent to imprudent behaviour. As imprudent intermediaries choose higher leverage than prudent ones, this
composition effect translates into an upward shift in the aggregate demand for funds.
3.3. Aggregate supply of funds
The aggregate supply of funds depends on the expected return on loans, ρ, which under risk shifting not only depends on
the face borrowing rate but also on both the share of imprudent intermediaries and the probability that they go bankrupt. In
state 1, which occurs with probability p, all intermediaries repay the face interest rate r to the lenders: prudent
intermediaries because they are always able to, imprudent ones because their risky bets turned out to be successful. In
state 2, which occurs with complementary probability, only prudent intermediaries, which are in number 1gðr; ϵÞ, are able
to repay r. Imprudent intermediaries' bets, on the contrary, turn out to be unsuccessful, leaving lenders with no repayment
at all. Summing up unit repayments across states and intermediaries types and rearranging, we find the ex ante gross return
on loans to be
ρðr; ϵÞ ¼ pr þ ð1pÞð1gðr; ϵÞÞr¼ rð1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞÞ: ð27Þ
Note that this ex ante return is strictly increasing in the face interest rate, i.e.,
ρrðr; ϵÞ ¼ 1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞð1pÞrgrðr; ϵÞ40: ð28Þ
The increasing of ρðr; ϵÞ with respect to r occurs for two reasons. First, a higher face interest rate increases intermediaries'
repayment if they do not default (the 1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞ40 part of (28)). Second, a higher face interest rate favours prudent
rather than risky behaviour by raising the threshold ~e, and hence by lowering the probability of default on a loan unit (the
ð1pÞgrðr; ϵÞ40 part). It follows that for ðϵ; wÞ given the loan supply function is a nondecreasing, continuous function of r,
which we may express as
Bsðr; ϵ;wÞ ¼wu′1ðrð1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞÞÞ: ð29Þ
Let us briefly summarise the properties of the aggregate supply curve, before we analyse the equilibrium in the market
for loanable funds. First, Bsðr; ϵ;wÞ is strictly increasing in r, holding (ϵ; w) constant; this follows from (5), the strictly
concavity of uðÞ, and the strict monotonicity of ρ w.r.t. r (see (28)). Second, from (5) it is strictly increasing in w, holding r
and ϵ constant. Third, it is increasing in ϵ, holding r and w constant. The reason for this is that a higher overall level of equity
in the economy raises the number of prudent intermediaries (i.e., gϵðr; ϵÞo0), and hence the expected return on loans
(see (27)).
In the (B; r) plane, the Bsðr; ϵ;wÞ curve lies to the left of its first-best analogue, B^sðr; ϵ;wÞ. This is because in the
equilibrium with risk shifting lenders expect a nonnegative fraction of intermediaries to go bankrupt if state s2 occurs.
Hence, any given value of the face interest rate r is associated with a lower expected return in the risk-shifting equilibrium
than in the first-best – and hence with a lower supply of loanable funds (see Fig. 2(b)).
3.4. Market clearing
In equilibrium, the total demand for funds by the intermediary sector must equal the total supply of funds provided by
outside lenders. In other words, the face interest rate that clears the market for loanable funds must satisfy
Bsðr; ϵ;wÞ ¼ Bdðr; ϵÞ ð30Þ
Since Bdðr; ϵÞ is continuously decreasing in r while Bsðr; ϵ;wÞ is continuously increasing in r, the equilibrium is unique
provided that it exists. Again, we are focusing on risk-shifting equilibria in which all intermediaries are leveraged, the
conditions under which this is the case being summarised in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that (i) θpRh14emax, and (ii) w4max½u′1ðpRhE=θÞ; θrð1pÞgðr ; ϵÞE þ u′1ðrð1ð1pÞgðr ; ϵÞÞÞ, where
r ¼ pRh1emax=θ. Then, the equilibrium with risk shifting is unique and such that bnðeÞ and bnnðeÞ are positive for all e∈½0; emax.
To summarise, the equilibrium is well behaved provided that lenders' income, w, is sufficiently large. The existence
conditions stated in Lemma 2 are slightly more stringent than those stated in Lemma 1, so the former also ensure the
existence of the first-best outcome characterised in Section 2.3.
The equilibrium in the market for loanable funds is depicted in Fig. 2(b). The intersection of the two curves gives the
equilibrium contracted loan rate r, given the exogenous parameters ðϵ;wÞ. The loan rate in turn determines the equilibrium
share of imprudent intermediaries gðr; ϵÞ (by Eq. (24)), as well as the equilibrium expected return on loans to intermediaries,
ρðr; ϵÞ (by (27)).
Finally, note that the despite differences in the implied equilibrium interest rate in the two economies, the equilibrium
amount of aggregate lending is the same. This can be proven as follows. In the first best, intermediaries never default so the
face interest rate is equal to the expected return on loans. From Eqs. (14) and (15), this expected return r^ is the (unique)
solution to
θðpRh1r^ÞE¼wu′1ðr^Þ ð31Þ
In the second best, the aggregate loan supply is wu′1ðρÞ (see Eq. ((5)), while the aggregate loan demand is given by
(26), where by (27) ρðr; ϵÞ ¼ rð1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞÞ. Hence, in the second best the expected return on loans ρðr; ϵÞ satisfies
θðpRh1ρðr; ϵÞÞE¼wu′1ðρðr; ϵÞÞ ð32Þ
Eqs. (31) and (32) imply that ρðr; ϵÞ ¼ r^ , i.e., lenders' expected return on their loans to intermediaries in the same in the
first and second best. By implication, they lend the same amount in equilibrium, i.e., Bsðρðr; ϵÞ;wÞ ¼ B^sðr^ ;wÞ. From (27) and
the fact that ρðr; ϵÞ ¼ r^ , we find the interest rate premium generated by the presence of imprudent intermediaries to be
r
r^
¼ gðr; ϵÞ
ð1pÞ1gðr; ϵÞ
;
which is positive and increasing in the both the number of such intermediaries, gðr; ϵÞ, and the probability that they go bust,
1p.
4. Impact of aggregate shocks
We may now state the main predictions of the model about how shifts in the underlying fundamentals (the supply of
funds and the distribution of intermediaries' capital) affect the three key equilibrium variables, r, ρðr; ϵÞ and gðr; ϵÞ.
Proposition 1 (Lending boom). An exogenous increase in the supply of funds (i.e., dw40) (i) lowers the equilibrium contracted
rate, r, (ii) lowers the expected return on loans, ρðr; ϵÞ, and (iii) raises the share of imprudent intermediaries in the economy,
gðr; ϵÞ.
Proposition 1 essentially states that easier financing conditions for intermediaries tend to fuel systemic risk by inducing
an increasing number of intermediaries to take larger and riskier bets; conversely, tighter credit raises the interest rate and
disciplines banks' risk-taking behaviour. The effect of the shift in the loan supply curve is depicted in Fig. 3(a). More
specifically, the boom is associated with a rightward shift in the Bs locus, whose direct effect is to lower the equilibrium
contracted loan rate. Holding ϵ constant, the new value of r is associated with a lower value of the equity cutoff ~eðrÞ in (23),
so that an increasing number of intermediaries become imprudent – i.e., gðr; ϵÞ rises. Both the lower value of r and the higher
value of gðr; ϵÞ contribute to lower the expected return on loans, ρðr; ϵÞ.
While our analysis remains formal, several interpretations may be given to the shift in credit supply leading to easier
financing conditions. According to Bernanke (2005), for example, a supply driven shift in funding occurred in the first half of
the last decade due to recycled balance-of-payment surpluses from China and oil-exporting countries; in this interpretation,
systemic risk in the U.S. was closely related to the “global imbalances” problem, which was itself rooted in the willingness of
Fig. 3. (a) Lending boom and (b) Equity squeeze (elastic supply of funds).surplus countries to hoard wealth in the form of U.S. assets. Another view has it that exceptionally loose monetary policy
leading to exceedingly low real interest rates in the wake of the 2001 recession in the U.S. would have given rise to a “ risk-
taking” channel of monetary policy, thereby fostering widespread systemic risk in the U.S. financial sector (see Taylor, 2009;
Adrian and Shin, 2009, as well as Altunbas et al. (2010) for a survey and some evidence).12 Be it the consequence of either or
both, the model unambiguously predicts that falling interest rates raise risk-taking by an increasing number of banks and
hence the economywide level of risk. Moreover, the model predicts that this increase in aggregate risk is rooted in changes
in the portfolio choices of less capitalised intermediaries – i.e., those to the left of, but close to, the equity cutoff ~eðrÞ.
Let us turn to the impact of the second aggregate shock under consideration, that on the cross-sectional distribution of
intermediaries' equity levels.
Proposition 2 (Equity squeeze). A leftward shift in the distribution of equity (i.e., dϵo0) raises the equilibrium interest rate, r. If
the elasticity of the loan supply with respect to the expected return on loans ρ is sufficiently high, then it also raises the share of
imprudent intermediaries, gðr; ϵÞ.
Proposition 2 reflects the three effects at work following a downward shift in the distribution of equity. First, for a given
value of the cut-off ~e, the shift directly increases the number of imprudent banks in the economy by lowering the stake of
“marginal” intermediaries (i.e., those who are initially to the right of, but close to, ~e); those intermediaries then
discontinuously raise their leverage while engaging in imprudent behaviour (see (16) and (20)), thereby raising the
demand for loanable funds. Second, to the extent that this shift lowers the overall equity base of the intermediary sector, E,
all intermediaries, which have a target portfolio size, seek to offset the loss in internal funding by external debt, again raising
the economywide demand for funding. Both of these effects shift the Bd-curve rightwards and exert an upward pressure on
the equilibrium borrowing rate, r. Third, this increase in the borrowing rate has a disciplining effect on the intermediary
sector by shifting the cut-off equity level ~e leftwards. Hence, while the effect of the equity squeeze on the borrowing rate is
not ambiguous, that on the share of imprudent intermediaries is. However, if the supply of funds is sufficiently elastic, then
the adjustment of the borrowing rate after the shock and its disciplining effect will be limited, ultimately causing gðr; ϵÞ
to rise.
This situation is depicted in Fig. 3(b). The initial distributional shift causes the gðr; ϵÞ curve to move leftwards. The direct
impact of higher risk (holding r fixed) is to lower the expected return on loans, ρðr; ϵÞ, which in the ðB; rÞ plane manifests
itself as an exogenous reduction in lending (i.e., an inwards shift of the Bs curve). Finally, the increase in the demand for
funding causes the Bd-curve to shift rightwards. If the supply of funds is sufficiently elastic (that is, the slope of the Bs curve
is sufficiently low), then the overall effect of the three shifts is to raise the equilibrium value of gðr; ϵÞ12 As argued by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009), these two views are more complementary than substitutes.
5. Extensions
5.1. Information about intermediaries' balance-sheets and endogenous market segmentation
Our analysis above emphasises intermediaries' balance-sheet opacity as a major source of systemic risk. The key
mechanism is that the unobservability of balance sheets makes it possible for bad banks to pretend to be good banks,
implying that clearing of the market for loanable funds operates in a single market and at a single interest rate. In order to
make this channel as transparent as possible, we derived our results under the somewhat extreme assumption that all
intermediaries look alike from the point of view of outside lenders. In reality, some information about intermediaries'
balance-sheet is available that may mitigate the opacity problem. In this section, we extend our analysis to allow for (noisy)
public signals about intermediaries's capital, which naturally generates a differentiation in the market for loanable funds –
in as much a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ intermediaries can to some extent be recognised as such. For the sake of tractability we
illustrate this possibility by means of a simple parametric example, but we conjecture that the properties that come out of
this exercise hold much more generally.
Distributions, signal structure and parameters. Let us assume here that the unconditional distribution of intermediaries'
inside equity is uniform with support ½0;1, so that f ðeÞ ¼ 1, FðeÞ ¼ e and E¼ 1=2. Outside lenders receive the following
symmetric binary signal τ about every intermediary: if e≥1=2, then τ¼ g (‘good’) with probability π∈½1=2;1Þ and τ¼ b (‘bad’)
w.p. 1π. Symmetrically, if eo1=2, then τ¼ b with probability π and τ¼ g w.p. 1π. Under these assumptions, the marginal
density of the signals is simply Prðτ¼ hÞ ¼ Prðτ¼ lÞ ¼ 1=2. From Bayes' rule, the observation of the signal produces
the following two conditional distributions and cumulative density functions (both of which are indexed by the signal
quality πÞ:
f ðe g; π
 Þ ¼ 2ð1πÞ for eo 12
2π for e≥ 12
; Fðe g; π
 Þ ¼ 2ð1πÞe for eo 12
12π þ 2πe for e≥ 12
((
ð33Þ
f ðe b; π
 Þ ¼ 2π for eo 12
2ð1πÞ for e≥ 12
; Fðe b; π
 Þ ¼ 2πe for eo 12
2π1þ 2ð1πÞe for e≥ 12
((
ð34Þ
Note that the quality of the signal encompasses two limit cases. When π ¼ 1=2, the signal is uninformative and the two
conditional distributions coincide with the unconditional one. When π-1, in the limit the signals exactly identify every
intermediary as belonging to the upper or the lower halves of the distribution. Regarding the other deep parameters, we set
p¼w¼ 1=2, θ¼ 1, Rh1 ¼ 4. Finally, we focus on the case where uðÞ ¼ 0, so that lenders only value terminal consumption and
inelastically lend w to the intermediary sector.
The signals identify two categories of intermediaries, and hence two separate markets for loanable funds, each with their
own face interest rate. In each market, the problem of an individual intermediary in is similar to that described in Section 3,
except that they now take their own face borrowing rate rτ as given. Under the assumed parameters, an intermediary
borrowing in market τ ð ¼ b; gÞ behaves prudently if and only if
e≥ ~eðrτÞ ¼ 23rτ=4; ð35Þ
while the share of imprudent intermediaries in that market is given by gτðrτ; πÞ ¼ Fð ~eðrτÞjτ; πÞ.
We may now compute the demand for funds in each market by integrating intermediaries' leverage choices as in (26).
Under our parameters, the demand for funds in market τ is
Bd;τ rτ; πð Þ ¼
Z ~eðrτ Þ
0
bnn rτ; eð Þ dFðe τ; πj Þ þ
Z 1
~eðrτ Þ
bn rτ; eð Þ dF e s; πj Þð
¼ 2rτ 11
2
gτ rτ; πð Þ
 
Eτ; ð36Þ
where, from Eqs. (33) and (34),
Eb ¼
Z 1
0
ef ðe b; π
 Þ de¼ 32π
4
and Eg ¼
Z 1
0
ef ðe g; π
 Þ de¼ 1þ 2π
4
:
Uninformative signals. Let us first solve for the equilibrium face interest rate and share of imprudent intermediaries in the
uninformative case (i.e., π ¼ 1=2), which corresponds to the baseline model analysed in the previous sections (since in this
situation both conditional equity distributions coincide with the unconditional one, and we are back to the single-market
case.) Under our parameter specification, the (unique) face interest rate r is determined by the following equilibrium
condition:
2rð1gðr;1=2Þ=2Þ1=2¼ 1=2; ð37Þ
where the left hand side is the aggregate demand for loanable funds and the right hand side is the aggregate supply of
loanable funds, w¼ 1=2. Using (27), we may then explicitly solve for the expected return on loans, which is given by
ρðr;1=2Þ ¼ 1≡ρ. By Eq. (27) again, the face interest rate must satisfy rð1Fð ~eðrÞÞ=2Þ ¼ 1. Since the unconditional CDF is
FðeÞ ¼ e and ~eðrÞ is given by (35), we get the equilibrium interest rate r¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
8=3
p
¼ 1:633, which in turns produces a share of
imprudent intermediaries of
gðr;1=2Þ ¼ 23r=4¼ 0:775 ð38Þ
Informative signals. We first note that even when π41=2 and markets are differentiated, by no-arbitrage and given
lenders' risk neutrality, the expected return on loans in the two markets must be identical, i.e., we must have
ρgðrg; πÞ ¼ ρbðrb; πÞ≡ ~ρðrg ; rb; πÞ. Second, by (27) this common expected rate of return satisfies
~ρðrg ; rb; πÞ ¼ rτð1gτðrτ; πÞ=2Þ; τ¼ b; g: ð39Þ
Using (36) and (39), we may express the demand for loanable funds in market τ as
Bd;τðrτ; πÞ ¼ 2 ~ρðrg ; rb; πÞEτ : ð40Þ
The marginal density of the signal is Prðτ¼ hÞ ¼ Prðτ¼ lÞ ¼ 1=2), so that total equity is ðEb þ EgÞ=2¼ E while the total
demand for loanable funds is (Bd;τðrτ; πÞ þ Bd;τðrτ; πÞÞ=2. The latter must sum up to the aggregate supply of loanable funds
w¼ 1=2, so from (40) we get ~ρðrg ; rb; πÞ ¼ 1¼ ρ. It can be shown (by contradiction) that for all π∈½1=2;1Þ and τ¼ b; g, we
always have ~eðrτÞ41=2, so the upper halves of the conditional cumulative distribution functions in (33) and (34) determine
the shares of imprudent intermediaries in each market. This implies that these shares are given by
gbðrb; πÞ ¼ Fð ~eðrbÞjb; πÞ ~eðrÞ41=2 ¼ 2π1þ 2ð1πÞð23rb=4Þ; ð41Þ
ggðrg; πÞ ¼ Fð~eðrgÞjg; πÞ ~eðrÞ41=2 ¼ 12π þ 2πð23rg=4Þ: ð42Þ
Finally, in both markets we have ρτðrτ; πÞ ¼ rτð1gðrτ; πÞ=2Þ. Using (41) and (42), the fact that ρτðrτ; πÞ ¼ 1, τ¼ g; b and
rearranging, we find that ðrb; rgÞ solve
1¼ rbðπ1=2þ 3ð1πÞrb=4Þ and 1¼ rgð1=2π þ 3πrg=4Þ:
Then, with ðrb; rgÞ known, we may compute the shares of imprudent intermediaries in each market from (41) and (42),
and that in the whole economy ðgbðrb; πÞ þ ggðrg; πÞÞ=2. When π ¼ 1=2, we have rb ¼ rg ¼ r¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
8=3
p
(the uninformative limit
studied above.) As π rises above π ¼ 1=2 – i.e., the signal becomes more and more informative–, rb goes up and rg goes down
– since low-equity versus high-equity intermediaries are better and better identified as such. Fig. 4 plots the two face
interest rates as a function of π, as well as the shares of imprudent intermediaries in the two markets and the implied
proportion of such intermediaries economywide. In this example, the more informative the signal, the higher the share of
imprudent intermediaries in the economy. To understand why this is the case, compare the uninformative case (π ¼ 1=2,
r¼1.633 and g¼0.775) to the polar opposite (π-1). Relative to the former, in the latter (i) low-equity intermediaries (i.e.,
those for whom eo1=2) are perfectly identified as excess risk takers but are charged accordingly (i.e., r¼2, g¼1, so that
ρ¼ 2ð11=2Þ ¼ 1.), and (ii), high-equity intermediaries enjoy lower face interest rates, which induces some of them to
behave imprudently (while they would be prudent when charged the high face rate that prevails in the uninformative case.)
5.2. Impact of capital requirements
In this section, we explore the effect on systemic risk of imposing capital constraints on intermediaries' behaviour. For
tractability, we carry out our analysis under the same parametric specification as in the previous section (i.e., f ðÞ is
uniformly distributed over ½0;1, p¼w¼ 1=2, θ¼ 1, Rh1 ¼ 4, and the supply of loanable funds is inelastic at w¼ 1=2.) We
consider two simple forms of capital ratios: a ‘naïve' capital ratio based exclusively on balance-sheet size, and a risk-based
capital ratio that ties the stringency of the ratio to the level of portfolio diversification achieved by the intermediary. As weFig. 4. Face interest rates and shares of imprudent intermediaries in markets b and g as a function of the precision of the signal.
show, the former may turn out to raise rather than lower aggregate risk taking, due to the impact of constrained firms on the
equilibrium interest rate. However, in our parametric example risk-based capital ratio are effective at curbing systemic risk
(assuming that they are feasible.)
Asset size-based capital ratios. We first consider the impact of a simple (naïve) capital ratio prescribing that intermediaries
must hold as initial equity at least some pre-specified fraction κ∈ð0;1Þ of total assets, so that e≥κ∑xi. This constraint might
be binding or not, depending on the equity level of each individual intermediary. We focus on the (realistic) case where κ is
(i) sufficiently high for the constraint to be binding at least for some intermediaries, given the equity distribution f(e); and
(ii) sufficiently low for the constraint not to be binding for intermediaries that would spontaneously choose the prudent
portfolio in the absence of a capital constraint (essentially because those are sufficiently capitalised in the first place). this
amounts to assuming that κ is positive but small. We first show that the constraint may be effective at limiting the leverage
of imprudent intermediaries – i.e., when it is binding–, but not at inducing portfolio diversification by those intermediaries.
Second, we show that by limiting the leverage of low-equity intermediaries, the capital ratio exerts a downward pressure on
the equilibrium face interest rate, which induces some of the originally prudent intermediaries to become imprudent. In
consequence, a capital ratio purely based on size may ultimately raise, rather than lowers, the share of imprudent
intermediaries in the economy.
Impact of the ratio on (low-equity) intermediaries. The leverage of an intermediary facing a binding capital constraint (so
that e¼ κ∑xi) is
̌bðeÞ ¼ κ∑xie¼ eðκ11Þ40: ð43Þ
For low values of κ, the constraint is potentially binding for low-equity intermediaries, i.e., those who heavily resort on
leverage in the absence of a capital constraint. As discussed above, we focus on the case where κ is sufficiently low for the
constraint to be potentially binding only for imprudent intermediaries. Under our parameters, in the absence of capital
constraint those imprudent intermediaries would choose a leverage level of (see (21))
bnnðr; eÞ ¼ 2r=2e: ð44Þ
The capital ratio is binding if and only if ̌bðeÞobnnðr; eÞ, that is, if and only if eoκð2r=2Þ≡ ̌eðr; κÞ. On the liability side, an
intermediary facing a binding capital constraint chooses a lower level of leverage than it would otherwise. On the asset side,
does the constraint alter its portfolio choice? The answer is no. To see this, compare the values of a prudent and an
imprudent intermediary with total assets given by ∑xi ¼ e=κ (i.e., the intermediary is constrained.) From our analysis in
Section 3 and under our parameters specification, the former and the latter are given by, respectively,
̌V
n
eð Þ ¼ reþ e
κ
 
2rð Þc e
κ
 
and ̌V
nn
eð Þ ¼ 1
2
reþ e
κ
 
4rð Þ
 
c e
κ
 
: ð45Þ
Since ̌V
nnðeÞ4 ̌V nðeÞ, an intermediary facing a binding constraint always chooses the imprudent portfolio
ð ̌x1; ̌x2Þ ¼ ðe=κ;0Þ.
Loanable funds equilibrium. Under our maintained assumption that κ is small, we have ̌eðrÞo ~eðrÞ, so that the capital
constraint may only be binding for originally imprudent intermediaries. Then, the demand for loanable funds by the
intermediary sector is given by
Bdðr; κÞ ¼
Z ̌eðr;κÞ
0
̌bðeÞ dFðeÞ þ
Z ~eðrÞ
̌eðr;κÞ
bnnðr; eÞ dFðeÞ þ
Z 1
~eðrÞ
bnðr; eÞ dFðeÞ:
Using (43) and (44), the fact that d FðeÞ ¼ de and rearranging, we may rewrite the latter expression as
Bd r; κð Þ ¼ 3
2
3
8
r2 κ
2
21
2
r
 2
: ð46Þ
The face interest rate that clears the market equates Bdðr; κÞwith the aggregate supply of funds, w¼ 1=2. When κ¼ 0 (our
baseline scenario), we again have r¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
8=3
p
(the solution to 3=23r2=8¼ 1=2Þ and gðr; ϵÞ ¼ 23r=4¼ 0:775 (see Eq. (38).) As
κ rises and constrains the leverage choices of more and more intermediaries, the aggregate demand curve Bdðr; ϵÞ shifts
down. Given the vertical loan supply curve Bs ¼ 1=2, the equilibrium face interest rate r must go down. Solving the equation
Bdðr; κÞ ¼ 1=2 for r, we indeed obtain the decreasing interest rate function
r κð Þ ¼ 4
3þ κ κ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
35κ
2
r !
: ð47Þ
Finally, since intermediaries facing a binding capital constraint choose the imprudent portfolio ð ̌x1; ̌x2Þ ¼ ðe=κ;0Þ, the
share of imprudent intermediaries in the economy is given by
R ~eðrÞ
0 de¼ ~e r κð Þð Þ ¼ 234r κð Þ, which is increasing in κ. To
summarise, simple capital ratios based on balance-sheet size are (in our example) ineffective at limiting systemic risk. Quite
on the contrary, by lowering the equilibrium face interest rate, the capital constraint worsens the risk-taking channel and
induces imprudent behaviour by some of those intermediaries that would otherwise behave prudently.
Risk-based capital ratios. One key reason for the ineffectiveness of simple capital ratios is that even though the ratio does
limit some of the intermediaries' borrowing, it does not curb their risk-taking incentives on the asset side. Suppose now that
the regulator (but not an outside lender) is able to observe the riskiness of intermediaries' portfolios and to set the capital
ratio accordingly. For example, assume that the capital ratio e=∑xi is κ∈ð0;1Þ for a prudent intermediary, but ~κ4κ for an
imprudent intermediary. Incorporating this risk-based capital ratios into the values of being prudent or imprudent in (45),
we find that a constrained intermediary prefers to be prudent if and only if
reþ eðpRh1rÞ=κcðe=κÞ4pðreþ eðRh1rÞ= ~κÞcðe= ~κÞ:
A sufficiently large value of ~κ (relative to κ) acts as a deterrent and induces prudent behaviour by constrained
intermediaries, so that κ rather than ~κ effectively applies. Under this regulatory arrangement, the aggregate demand for
loanable funds is as in (46), and consequently the equilibrium face interest rate is as in (47). However, since intermediaries
facing a binding constraint now behave prudently, the share of imprudent intermediaries in the economy is nowR ~eðrÞ
̌eðr;κÞ de¼ ~eðrÞ
̌eðr; κÞ ¼ 23rðκÞ=4κð2rðκÞ=2Þ, where rðκÞ is given by (47). The latter expression is decreasing in κ, implying
that a risk-based capital requirement is effective at reducing economywide risk-taking.
5.3. Endogenous inside equity stake
The analysis in Sections 2–4 is based on the simplifying assumption that the cross-sectional distribution of
intermediaries' inside equity levels is exogenous. In reality, inside equity investment adjusts endogenously following
changes in the expected gains from investing, and such investments are likely to feed back to aggregate risk-taking. To
illustrate this mechanism, we provide a simple extension to our baseline scenario wherein the cross-sectional distribution of
inside equity becomes endogenous and dependent on the other deep parameters of the model (including the lending boom
parameter w). More specifically, we assume that potential inside equity holders are endowed with an initial endowment e0,
a quantity e∈½0; e0 of which may be invested in a bank and the rest being consumed (Stage 1). After this choice is made, the
individually optimal portfolio is determined as described in Section 3.2 (Stage 2).13 Hence, when deciding how much to
invest in the bank, potential equity holders value the future utility from owning e against that from consuming e0e. Finally,
e0 is distributed with density f ðe0Þ and continuous support ½0; e0max.
This problem is not tractable in general because VðeÞ is convex – see Section 3–, hence equityholders' programme is not
concave and the first-order condition is not sufficient for optimality. One way to solve equityholders' individual problem
would be to compute numerically the expected welfare associated with each value of e on a suitably discretised interval and
for a specific set of deep parameters. However, finding the equilibriumwould then require solving a complicated fixed-point
problem, due to the endogenous state variable of interest (e) having a full cross-sectional distribution. Instead, we focus on a
simple example that can be solved analytically, but which captures the essence of the endogenous response of bank equity
to macroeconomic conditions in the context of our model. More specifically, we assume that equityholders have linear initial
consumption utility ϕðe0eÞ, where ϕ40, and we thus look for the individually optimal policy function eðe0Þ defined as
eðe0Þ ¼ arg maxe∈½0;e0  ϕðe0eÞ þ VðeÞ, where VðeÞ ¼max½VnðeÞ;VnnðeÞ is determined as in Section 3, and taking r (and hence
~eðrÞ) as given. We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The optimal policy function eðe0Þ is as follows:13
choosIf ϕ4r, then eðe0Þ ¼ 0 for all e0∈½0; e0max; If ϕopr, then eðe0Þ ¼ e0 for all e0∈½0; e0max; If ϕ∈½pr; r then eðe0Þ ¼ 0 for all e0∈½0; eðrÞ while eðe0Þ ¼ e0 for all e0∈ðeðrÞ; e0max, where
eðrÞ≡ð1pÞ ~eðrÞ=ðrϕÞ4 ~eðrÞ: ð48ÞIntuitively, when ϕ4r the marginal utility of consumption is so high that equityholders prefer to consume their entire
endowment; in this case, the economywide inside equity level is E¼0 – and hence independent of all other parameters in
the model. At the extreme opposite, when ϕopr the marginal utility of consumption is so low that equityholders always
prefer to invest their entire endowment e0; then, aggregate inside equity is E¼
R e0max
0 e0f ðe0Þ de0, i.e., it only depends on the
(exogenous) distribution of equityholders initial endowment. We focus on the interesting case where proϕor, so that
aggregate inside equity is given by EðrÞ ¼ R e0maxeðrÞ e0f ðe0Þ de0 and hence responds endogenously to the equilibrium face interest
rate r. Then, using Leibniz rule and Eq. (48), we find that
E′ rð Þ ¼ e rð Þf e rð Þð Þ ∂eðrÞ
∂r
¼ ð1pÞeðrÞf ðeðrÞÞ
ðrϕÞ2
ϕ ~e rð Þ rϕð Þr ~e′ rð Þ
 ;
which is strictly positive since eðrÞ4 ~eðrÞ40 while ~e′ðrÞo0 – see Eqs. (23) and (48). In other words, as the equilibrium face
interest rate r falls (following, e.g., a lending boom), the threshold level eðrÞ rises, leading an increasing number of
equityholders to consume, rather than save, their initial endowment; this in turn translates into a lower aggregate inside
equity level EðrÞ. The impact of this effect on the equilibrium for loanable funds is as follows. Recall from (26) that the
aggregate demand for loanable funds under risk shifting Bdðr; ϵÞ falls with aggregate inside equity E. Hence, the dependence
of E on r strengthens the response of the aggregate demand for loans to changes in the face interest rate. This greaterWe solve for equityholders' sequential problem under the natural assumption that there is no commitment. Hence, they take e as given when
ing (x1 ; x2Þ in the second stage.
interest-rate elasticity of demand will tend to make the equilibrium face interest rate r less responsive to aggregate shocks
affecting the loan supply curve, such as the lending boom analysed in Section 4. To see this more concretely, consider again
the case where lenders only value terminal consumption, so that Bs ¼w. Then from (26) the market-clearing condition for
the market for loanable funds Bdðr; ϵÞ ¼ Bs gives θ½pRh1rð1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞÞEðrÞ ¼w. Total differencing this expression and
rearranging, we get
 dr
dw
¼ 1
θð1ð1pÞgðr; ϵÞÞθð1pÞrgrðr; ϵÞ þ E′ðrÞ
40;
which is strictly decreasing in E′ðrÞ. Hence, the impact of the lending boom on the interest rate under endogenous equity
adjustment is qualitatively similar to that under exogenous equity, although it is smaller in magnitude (in absolute value).
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the portfolio and leverage choices of limited-liability intermediaries and their
implications for the level of aggregate risk and the way it responds to changes in economic conditions. The novelty of
our framework relative to earlier analyses of intermediaries' risk-shifting behaviour is twofold. First, we emphasise the
disciplining role of shareholders' inside equity stake and the heterogeneities that it implies for their equilibrium balance
sheets – both on the asset and liability sides. Second, we explicitly model changes in economywide risk-shifting along the
extensive margin – i.e., the number of intermediaries that endogenously choose to expose themselves to the risk of default–,
in addition to the usual intensive margin –i.e., the change in their individual balance-sheet choices.
A important property of the equilibrium is that it jointly determines the (common) borrowing rate faced by
intermediaries and the level of aggregate risk in the economy, due to the endogenous sorting of intermediaries along the
equity dimension. Unsurprisingly, intermediaries with low inside equity stake are more likely to behave imprudently than
those with high stake. More interestingly, the sorting of intermediaries is itself affected by the interest rate, with falling
interest associated with a rising number of imprudent intermediaries and aggregate risk. For this reason, exogenous factors
that affect the market for loanable funds (e.g., international capital flows) have a direct impact on the level of risk generated
by the financial sector. Similarly, exogenous changes in the distribution of intermediaries' capital affect the equilibrium
interest rate, aggregate risk, and the return that ultimate lenders can expect from entrusting the financial sector with their
funds. While we have focused on two specific financial fragility channels (the risk-taking channel of low interest rates and
the gambling-for-resurrection channel of falling equity), our model could be elaborated further to analyse the impact on
intermediaries risk taking of other changes in macroeconomic conditions. For example, it is frequently argued that booms
are times of low risk aversion, thereby affecting investors' portfolio choices (e.g., Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Campbell and
Cochrane, 1999). Analysing the impact of changes in risk aversion for intermediaries' risk taking would require departing
from the risk neutral assumption, with nontrivial implications for both intermediaries' choices and the implied aggregate
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